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UNPROFITABLE MERGERS: TOWARD A 
MARKET-BASED LEGAL RESPONSE 
George W Dent, Jr. * 
The reams of commentary on corporate mergers, acquisitions, and 
tender offers have focused largely on protection of shareholders of ac-
quired (or target) companies from both the depredations of acquiring (or 
raider) companies and the cupidity of their own managements in either 
negotiating the terms or obstructing the accomplishment of transactions. 
Virtually no attention has been paid to the plight of shareholders of ac-
quiring companies devastated by unwise acquisitions. This oversight is 
surprising: some acquisitions have been spectacular disasters, destroying 
hundreds of millions of dollars in the value of the acquiring company's 
stock. I Nor are these isolated cases: on average, acquisitions produce 
little or no gain for acquiring companies.2 A few commentators have 
recommended eradicating unprofitable acquisitions by requiring ap-
proval of the acquirer's shareholders, altering the accounting treatment 
of mergers, or enjoining conglomerate mergers. Close analysis shows 
that these proposals would not solve the problem. This Article proposes 
instead a response based on the most reliable index of the profitability of 
an acquisition-the reaction of the acquirer's stock price. 
Part I of this Article will describe and explain the problem of un-
profitable acquisitions.3 Part II will show that prior proposals cannot 
solve the problem and would create new problems of their own. 4 Part III 
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. B.A. 1969, J.D. 1973, Columbia University; LL.M. 
1981, New York University. I gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of Arthur Best, James 
Brook, Aleta Estreicher, Daniel Fischel, Michel Rosenfeld, and David Schoenbrod. None of them 
bears responsibility for the views expressed here. Preparation of this Article was assisted by a re-
search grant from New York Law School. 
I See infra text accompanying notes 6, 7 & 23. 
2 See infra text accompanying note 8. 
3 See infra text accompanying notes 6-41. 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 42-95. 
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will propose a solution to the problem and answer possible objections. 5 
I. UNPROFITABLE ACQUISITIONS, THEIR CAUSES, AND THE LAW'S 
CURRENT RESPONSE 
A. The Problem of Unprofitable Acquisitions 
Corporate acquisitions often send the market value of the acquiring 
company's stock plummeting. The losses can be dramatic. When Du-
Pont acquired Conoco, the market value of its stock sank $789 million, a 
9.9% de9rease. 6 Chesebrough-Ponds, Internorth, and Allied also suf-
fered sharp losses when they announced their respective acquisitions of 
Stauffer Chemical, Houston Natural Gas, and SignaP Although such 
astonishing declines are atypical, acquisitions generally are no blessing 
for the acquired company's shareholders. Some studies have found, on 
average, slight gains from acquisitions, but other studies have found that, 
on average, acquiring companies suffer losses, 8 and even the more opti-
5 See infra text accompanying notes 96-I49. 
6 Ruback, The Conoco Takeover and Stockholder Returns, SLOAN MGMT. REV., Winter I982, 
at I7, I9, 21. See Wall St. J., Oct. II, I978, at 47, col. 3 (upon announcement of acquisition, value of 
acquirer's stock fell 7%). 
7 Chesebrough-Ponds' stock fell over 10%, a loss in value of about $135 million, upon an-
nouncement of its acquisition of Stauffer. Cole, $1.25 Billion Is Bid for Stauffer, N.Y. Times, Feb. 
20, I985, at Dl, col. 3. Rumors alone of Intemorth's acquisition of Houston Natural Gas caused 
Intemorth's stock to fall3%. Cole, Houston Natural Bid Seen, N.Y. Times, May 2, I985, at Dl, col. 
6; see also infra note 23. When the merger agreement was announced, Internorth's stock fell further, 
for a two-day decline of IO%-a net loss of over $250 million. Cole, Gas Pipeline Giants Agree to a 
Merger, N.Y. Times, May 3, I985, at Dl, col. 5. On the day it was announced that Allied would 
acquire Signal Companies, Allied's stock dropped nearly IO%, a total market loss of over $350 
million. Cole, $5 Billion Allied Deal for Signal, N.Y. Times, May I6, I985, at Dl, col. 6. Ironically, 
"[i]n trading after the exchange closed, Allied bounced back to $42, down only $1.875, after it said 
that it was no longer interested in bidding for Hughes [Aircraft Company]." Id. In other words, 
Allied offset some of its losses from the Signal acquisition by stating that it would not make another 
acquisition, which presumably would also have been unprofitable. See also Crudele, Rorer Buys 
Drug Unit of Rev/on, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, I985, at 29, col. I (Rorer's stock fell 8% upon agreement 
to purchase Revlon's prescription drug unit); Fabrikant, Lorimor in Accord to Merge, N.Y. Times, 
Oct. 8, I985, at Dl, col. 4 (Telepictures' stock fell nearly 10% on agreement to acquire Lorimar). 
8 Some studies find net gains to acquirers. One study, for example, found that bidders' stock 
price gained on average 3.8%. Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific 
Evidence, II J. FIN. EcoN. 5, II, 16-17 (I983); see also Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the 
Market for Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. 345 (I980). Some studies have concluded that any profits 
from acquisitions are insufficient to justify their transaction costs. See Dodd & Ruback, Tender 
Offers and Stockholder Returns: An Empirical Analysis, 5 J. FIN. EcoN. 35I (1977); Mandelker, 
Risk and Return: The Case of Merging Firms, I J. FIN. EcoN. 303 (I974). Other studies find net 
losses to bidders. See, e.g., R. BREALEY, SECURITY PRICES IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET 54-55 
(I971); Dodd, Merger Proposals, Management Discretion and Stockholder Wealth, 8 J. FIN. EcoN. 
105 (I980). Finally, some studies find that losses to acquiring companies are so large as to equal 
gains to targets. See, e.g., Firth, Takeovers, Shareholder Returns, and the Theory of the Firm, 94 Q. 
J. EcoN. 235 (1980) (reviewing British data); Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of Merger Activity and 
the Objective Functions of Merging Firms, 11 J. FIN. EcoN. 155, 178 (1983); Osborne, Returns to 
Shareholders of Acquiring and Acquired Companies: The Case of Acquisitions of Technology-Based 
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mistic studies do not deny that many acquisitions depreciate the bidder's 
stock. Further, all the studies may understate investor losses from acqui-
sitions because they measure only gains or losses to common stock. A 
major acquisition financed with debt or retained earnings can also devas-
tate holders of senior securities, who suddenly find the purchaser's cush-
ion of equity in relation to its debt drastically depleted. 9 
Despite these frequent losses, one might deny that any problem ex-
ists. Professors Easterbrook and Fischel have argued that corporate 
managers should strive to maximize returns to investors generally, rather 
than to their own shareholders. 10 Accepting this argument might mean 
encouraging mergers, even if the purchaser's shareholders suffer losses, 
so long as investors as a whole still profit because the gains to sharehold-
ers of the acquired company exceed the losses to shareholders of the pur-
chaser. This arguably is desirable not only because it increases total 
wealth but also because individual shareholders can avoid the risk of loss 
by holding diversified portfolios. 11 As applied to unprofitable acquisi-
tions, the argument has serious flaws; it is not even clear that Easter-
brook and Fischel would apply it here. 12 Some studies find that, on 
average, losses to acquiring-company shareholders at least equal gains to 
acquired-company shareholders. 13 Even if these studies are wrong, in 
many cases losses do exceed gains. 14 Moreover, many shareholders are 
not diversified. The law traditionally has not disregarded their interests, 
and it is questionable whether it should. It is especially troubling that 
Easterbrook and Fischel would deem corporate managers to owe fiduci-
ary allegiance not to their own shareholders, but to the market generally. 
Would this not include the corporation's own bondholders, who often 
suffer from acquisitions? Would they require managers to sell the com-
pany's securities at the lowest possible price rather than the highest? As 
Professor Coffee has pointed out, it is hard to differentiate a duty to the 
Firms in the Over-the-Counter Market (SEC Capital Market Working Paper No. 3 1980); see also 
Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's 
Role in Corporate Governance, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1160 n.31 (1984) (citing authorities finding 
that acquirers incur net losses). Although many of these studies focus on the immediate market 
reaction as shown in the acquirer's price, there is no evidence that these reactions are biased-that is, 
there is no evidence of a general later rebound in acquirers' stock prices. See infra text accompany-
ing note 115. 
9 See Prokesch, Merger Wave: How Stocks and Bonds Fare, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1986, at AI 
(bondholders of both acquiring and acquired companies "are often big losers"). 
10 Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Contra! Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 708-15 (1982). 
II !d. at 714. 
12 Professor Coffee assumes that they do. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 1216-21. Easterbrook and 
Fischel, however, do not actually apply their "fiduciary principle" to unprofitable mergers. Indeed, 
one of their conditions to application of this principle is that all "parties to the transaction be at least 
as well off as before the transaction." Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 10, at 698. This condition 
obviously is not met when the acquirer's stock price declines. 
13 See supra note 8. 
14 Coffee, supra note 8, at 1168 n.56 and authorities cited therein. 
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market in takeover situations from a duty to the public generally, and 
many investors may rationally decline to diversify their portfolios fully. 15 
There is also a more fundamental flaw in applying the Easterbrook-
Fischel thesis to the present problem. Barring an acquisition in which 
losses to the purchaser are exceeded by gains to the acquired company 
does not mean that the net gains necessarily are lost. The acquisition 
also might be made at a profit by the same acquirer at a lower price or by 
another bidder who can profit more from the target's assets. Indeed, 
eliminating mergers that are unprofitable to the purchaser will help en-
sure that the target's assets go to the purchaser who can use them best. 16 
Moreover, ending unprofitable acquisitions would reduce the risk of 
stock ownership, which is desirable. 17 
Another possible objection to considering unprofitable acquisitions a 
problem is that declines in the acquirer's share price do not prove that 
the acquisition is detrimental. But theories of market behavior, espe-
cially the efficient market hypothesis, suggest that stock market prices 
are the best evidence of changes in a company's value. 18 
B. The Causes of Unprofitable Acquisitions 
If unprofitable acquisitions resulted from mere mistakes of judg-
ment, perhaps the law could tolerate them as it does other mistakes of 
business judgment.l9 Unrewarding acquisitions are too common to ad-
mit of such an explanation, however. Also, managers of acquiring com-
panies often persist in completing an acquisition even though the market 
15 Coffee, supra note 8, at 1174, 1216-21. Even a rational investor may not have a fully diversi-
fied stock portfolio because of the transaction costs of full diversification and because the rational 
investor seeks a diversified investment portfolio of which stocks are only one element and may be 
used to balance other elements. See id. at 1218 n.223. 
16 Consider this hypothetical: A Corp. has determined that it could realize gains by purchasing 
all the stock of C Corp. at up to $28 per share. B Corp. could realize gains by purchasing C at up to 
$30 per share. B has bid $29 per share. I submit that there is no good reason to permit A to bid $30 
per share. At that price the transaction would be unprofitable for A. Indeed, as to the market 
generally, this transaction would be inferior because the additional $1 gain per share to C's share-
holders would be outweighed by the $2 loss per share to A. Prohibiting an unprofitable purchase by 
A helps to ensure the takeover with the larger synergistic gains, the takeover by B. 
17 The danger of losses from acquisitions increases the risk of an investment in the acquiring 
company. Even if these losses are offset by corresponding gains to target shareholders (which is not 
necessarily a valid assumption, see Malatesta, supra note 8, at 178), they complicate the risk-averse 
investor's goal of eliminating firm-specific risks. Most investors are risk averse and therefore acquire 
portfolios of investments that balance the risks of individual investments. V. BRUDNEY & M. 
CHIRELSTEIN, CASES & MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 1146, 1152-53 (2d ed. 1979); J. 
WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 318-19 (5th ed. 1975). By increasing the risks of 
loss in individual stocks, unprofitable mergers complicate this effort to minimize the total risk to a 
portfolio. 
18 See infra text accompanying notes 109-18. 
19 The doctrine of judicial noninterference with managerial discretion is called the business judg-
ment rule. This is the basis on which courts have refused to interfere with unprofitable acquisitions. 
See infra text accompanying notes 37-39. 
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already has disapproved it by knocking down the price of the acquirer's 
shares. 
If unprofitable mergers cannot be dismissed as occasional errors of 
judgment, what does explain them? Corporate managers may seek 
growth of firm size rather than maximization of share price in order to 
justify better compensation and perquisites, to increase prestige, to ex-
pand opportunities for promotion, and, perhaps most importantly, to 
protect themselves from the discipline of the market. 20 In short, they 
often engage in empire building. Market restraints on management's dis-
cretion cannot prevent this. The threat of hostile tender offers sometimes 
limits managerial discretion. 21 Growth through acquisition, however, di-
minishes this threat by making any takeover more expensive and compli-
cated and increasing the probabilities of antitrust or other regulatory 
obstacles to a potential raider.22 Indeed, lawyers often recommend that 
corporations fearing a takeover fortify themselves by acquisitions that 
create such difficulties, either to defeat an existing tender offer or to dis-
courage potential raiders from making an offer. 23 An acquisition also 
20 See Coffee, supra note 8, at 1157 n.24, 1167-69, 1222-34; Marris & Mueller, The Corporation, 
Competition, and the Invisible Hand, 18 J. ECON. LIT. 32, 36-37, 42, 46 {1980); Note, The Conflict 
Between Managers and Shareholders in Diversifying· Acquisitions: A Portfolio Theory Approach, 88 
YALE L.J. 1238, 1243-44 (1979); Do Mergers Really Work?, Bus. WK., June 3, 1985, at 88, 89 
(executive ego is one reason for mergers). These works, which expressly discuss the motives for 
mergers, are but a small part of a broader literature arguing that managers generally strive to maxi-
mize growth rather than profits. See W. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH 96 
(rev. ed. 1967); J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 171-77 (2d ed. 1971); R. MARRIS, 
THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF "MANAGERIAL" CAPITALISM 101-07 (1964). This literature shows, 
for example, that executive salaries are more closely related to firm size than to profits. Dennis, 
Two-Tiered Tender Offers and Greenmail: Is New Legislation Needed?, 19 GA. L. REV. 281, 313 
(1985). 
21 The seminal work is Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. PoL. EcoN. 
110 (1965). 
22 See Coffee, supra note 8, at 1167 n.51; Lipton & Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Direc-
tors' Responsibilities-An Update, 40 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1421-22 (1985). The greater expense and 
complexity tends to discourage takeover attempts through proxy fights as well as tender offers. 
23 A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES AND PLANNING 36 (1978); Lowen-
stein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 CoLUM. L. REV. 249, 
305 (1983); see Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 
(1981). The court there noted that Joseph Flom, a prominent takeover l~wyer, had advised Mar-
shall Field to make acquisitions as "a legal way of coping with unfriendly takeover attempts," id. at 
278; that this would make Field "too large to be acquired" or create antitrust impediments for any 
other major retailer, id. at 305 (Cudahy, J., dissenting); that this advice was followed by making 
acquisitions that would create antitrust problems for interested bidders, id. at 278; accord id. at 305-
06 (Cudahy, J., dissenting); and that this was done in connection with the takeover attempt at issue 
in Panter, id. at 280-81; accord id. at 306-10 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). 
Even when a company has not been made the target of a tender offer, the financial press some-
times perceives that the company has made an acquisition to discourage raiders. Thus, when Chese-
brough-Ponds agreed to acquire Stauffer Chemical, and Chesebrough's stock fell over 10% in one 
day, analysts said that the acquisition was "a transparent attempt by Chesebrough to protect itself 
from being taken over." Cuff, Cosmetics Maker Diversifies Again, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1985, at Dl, 
col. 5. One analyst said Chesebrough's chairman was" 'looking for a self-protection device, ... for a 
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can divest a company of cash that attracts raiders and replace the cash 
with debt that repels raiders. 24 Thus, even unprofitable acquisitions can 
enhance the compensation, perquisites, and promotion opportunities of 
the acquiring company's management and also deter takeovers. In short, 
acquisitions can eviscerate the principal restraint on self-serving behavior 
by management: the operation of market forces through tender offers. 
This confutes claims that the market will discipline managements that 
make unwise acquisitions. 25 
Nor can the need to raise new capital restrain unwise acquisitions. 
Managements need not worry that their self-serving behavior will impair 
the price' at which they can sell their stock because most publicly traded 
companies rarely issue new stock.26 When they do publicly issue stock, 
they need not care about reducing the price they can obtain because most 
of the loss from the reduced price falls on existing shareholders, not man-
agement.27 Moreover, even if management felt compelled to limit its 
own discretion, it would be hard to draft a prohibition on unwise acquisi-
tions and inefficient to require each company to do so individually.28 
way to be unappealing to corporate sharks.' " Cole, $1.25 Billion is Bid for Stauffer, supra note 7, at 
D6, col. 6 (quoting Jack L. Salzman of Smith, Barney, Harris Upham & Co.). This is not unique: 
"companies are sometimes led to doing perverse things to avoid rape. They may overpay for an 
acquisition in order to make themselves less sexy to potential rapists." Sloan, Why Is No One Safe?, 
FORBES, Mar. 11, 1985, at 134, 137. 
24 Lowenstein, supra note 23, at 305. Analysts speculated that "the main motivation for [Chese-
brough-Pond's acquisition of Stauffer Chemical] is to discourage takeover attempts by assuming a 
heavy debt load that no potential raider would want." Cuff, supra note 23, at D6, col. 5. Although 
an acquisition with stock does not divest the acquirer of cash, it not only increases the number of 
shares that a raider must acquire to gain control but may also place a substantial block of the . 
acquirer's stock in the hands of the former principal shareholders of the acquired company. The 
latter may be offered representation on the acquiring company's board or, if they are former officers 
of the acquired company, offered positions with the acquiring company. They then tend to identify 
with incumbent management and to become allies if a takeover bid occurs. 
25 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 10, at 707; Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a 
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1185 (1981) [herein-
after Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role]. 
26 See Myers, The Capital Structure Puzzle, 39 J. FIN. 575, 581-82 (1984). Companies prefer 
retained earnings as the source of funds for growth. If external financing is necessary, debt is pre-
ferred to equity; net new stock issues provided at most 6% of financing for nonfinancial corporations 
in 1973-1982. Id. 
27 Managers will suffer from declining share prices to the extent that they are shareholders. But 
managers of large public companies often own only a tiny fraction of the outstanding shares, so that 
the effect of a decline is insignificant. Moreover, even if their loss is substantial, managers prefer it to 
the much more serious risk of displacement in a hostile tender offer. 
28 The very enforceability of such an internal rule would be doubtful both because of its unique-
ness and because of limitations on the doctrine of ultra vires. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS 
OF CORPORATIONS § 184 (3d ed. 1983). In trying to draft such a limitation, managements would 
face the same problem as commentators who have sought to impose a limit by law. The only effec-
tive, appropriate test would be that proposed by this Article-a bar on acquisitions that cause the 
acquirer's stock price to decline. See infra text accompanying notes 96-108. If this is the ideal 
solution, why not make it a standard term of all equity investment contracts-that is, impose it by 
law? 
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Managers also may pursue acquisitions in order to diversify their 
companies, and thereby reduce the risk of wide fluctuations in compensa-
tion based on the corporation's earnings in a single industry.29 Although 
diversification undoubtedly is a factor encouraging acquisitions, it proba-
bly is not a major one. 30 Moreover, there is little evidence that diversify-
ing (or conglomerate) mergers are less profitable than other mergers. 31 
That corporate managers may prefer corporate growth for selfish 
reasons does not necessarily mean that in pursuing acquisitions they in-
tend to harm shareholders. As between two takeover candidates that 
offer the acquirer equal growth and protection from takeovers, manage-
ment has no reason to prefer the acquisition that is less profitable to its 
shareholders, and many reasons to prefer the more profitable.32 Why, 
then, are there so many unprofitable acquisitions? 
First, no profitable takeover candidate may be readily apparent. 
The search for takeover candidates is expensive and complicated. Com-
panies that clearly are underpriced33 or offer substantial opportunities for 
synergy34 may already have been snapped up. Attractive candidates may 
reject a friendly merger and be immune to a hostile takeover. Even if one 
takeover candidate appears most profitable, the acquirer's management 
may prefer a different candidate. One candidate, for example, might 
hold greater promise for creating regulatory or antitrust obstacles to any 
subsequent takeover bid for the raider.35 Thus, in pursuing growth and 
security against takeovers through merger, the acquirer's management 
may be unable to find a merger that is profitable to its shareholders. 
C The Law's Response 
In evaluating unprofitable acquisitions, courts repeatedly pay lip 
29 Note, supra note 20, at 1241-44. 
30 See infra text accompanying notes 84-88. 
3 1 See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
32 A profitable acquisition should increase management's compensation based on earnings or 
share price, enhance prestige, and improve the possibility of continued corporate growth. In sum, 
"[e]ven the empire builder will look for transactions with substantial potential for gain." Dennis, 
supra note 20, at 3 3 8. 
33 If one accepts the efficient market hypothesis-that the market rationally prices stocks on the 
basis of all available information-there is no such thing as an underpriced public company. Easter-
brook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 25, at 1166-67. Some commentators question whether the 
hypothesis is valid, especially in terms of setting a purchace price for an entire company. See Lowen-
stein, supra note 23, at 274. For purposes of this Article it is unnecessary to resolve this debate. It 
suffices to note that the frequency of unprofitable acquisitions suggests that there is not a large, 
readily identifiable pool of attractive takeover candidates. 
34 For present purposes, synergy means any increase in the total market value of two companies 
arising from their merger. Such an increase could result from an increase in market power (monop-
oly or monopsony), improved management, tax benefits, superior access to capital, or any other of a 
number of reasons. See Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. 
REv. 1028, 1030-32 (I 982); Coffee, supra note 8, at 1166-67. 
35 See supra text accompanying note 22. 
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service to the managers' fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder wealth, 
but invariably deny recovery no matter how large the shareholders' 
loss. 36 The response of the courts is disturbing in two respects. First, 
courts have analyzed each unprofitable transaction in isolation. This has 
made it much easier to view an unprofitable acquisition as merely an 
exceptional mistake than it would be if courts recognized that unprofita-
ble acquisitions are common, perhaps even the norm rather than the ex-
ception.37 Second, courts have treated acquisitions as involving no 
conflict of interest for the acquirer's managers and, accordingly, have 
applied the business judgment rule to such cases rather than the stricter 
standard that would apply to self-dealing. 38 Although formulations of 
the business judgment rule vary, it generally requires the plaintiff to 
prove bad faith or, at least, conscious disregard of the interests of share-
holders by the defendants. 39 This has proved a virtually impossible bur-
den to bear, not only with respect to unprofitable acquisitions but to any 
corporate decision. 
Neither do the federal securities laws offer any protection. Rule 
lOb-S requires proof of a misrepresentation or omission of a material 
fact; 40 these are rare in an acquisition. Section 14(e) of the 1934 Act 
prohibits fraud as well as manipulation or deception, but the Supreme 
Court recently held that it, too, requires proof of manipulation or 
deception.41 
36 There is no known case in which an unprofitable acquisition has been challenged successfully. 
Challenges have failed for various reasons. See, e.g., Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904 
(Del. Ch. 1973); Lewis v. Bailey, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 19, 1985, at 14, col. 2 (Sup. Ct., King's County); 
Danziger v. Kennecott Copper Corp., No. 21941/77 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, Dec. 5, 1977), a.ff'd 
mem., 60 A.D.2d 552, 400 N.Y.S.2d 724 (App. Div. 1977); see a/sa Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 
646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (affirming dismissal of shareholder's 
complaint alleging that Marshall Field made unprofitable acquisitions to fend off a tender offer); 
Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702-04 (2d Cir. 1980) (dismissing complaint of 
tender offeror alleging that target persisted in unprofitable merger in order to defeat the tender offer). 
Although the reported cases have denied relief, some general principles of corporate law argue for a 
different result, and these principles have prevailed in cases involving issues that are arguably simi-
lar. See infra text accompanying notes 130-36. 
3 7 See supra text accompanying notes 6-8. 
38 See infra note 133. 
39 See Dent, The Revolution in Corporate Governance, the Monitoring Board, and the Director's 
Duty of Care, 61 B.U.L. REV. 623, 646-48 (1981). 
40 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977). Plaintiff-shareholders would 
have to show that management had materially deceived the shareholders. Since shareholders of the 
acquiring company are not generally asked to approve an acquisition, it is not even clear whether 
false statements to the shareholders would be material. But see T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 498-99 (1985). More important, since courts will not enjoin an unprofitable ac-
quisition under state law, shareholders rarely can stop an unprofitable acquisition. Management has 
little need, therefore, to mislead about the facts of the transaction. 
4I Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985). 
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II. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Although most discussion of takeovers has focused on the plight of 
shareholders of target companies, some proposals have sought to protect 
shareholders of acquiring companies. Further, some proposals to protect 
target shareholders might affect shareholders of acquirers as well. This 
section will analyze these proposals. 
A. Restricting Defenses Against Tender Offers 
Most commentators believe that takeovers are beneficial and that 
defensive maneuvers by targets should be restricted by law. Some com-
mentators criticize specific defensive tactics, and there have been legisla-
tive moves to bar some tactics, such as "greenmail" payments.42 Other 
commentators would prohibit defensive maneuvers altogether or limit 
them to the holding of an orderly auction.43 Intuitively, it seems that 
forbidding defensive tactics might lower premiums in takeovers and thus 
diminish the number of unprofitable acquisitions.44 The law cannot ban 
all defensive tactics, however-only those that serve solely to thwart 
tender offers.45 Many actions that discourage tender offers may still 
serve other, legitimate business purposes; corporate acquisitions are one 
42 In September 1984, a House committee reported out a bill that would have curbed greenmail 
and other abuses, but the session ended before the full House could act on it. Similar efforts are 
continuing. See Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1114, at 9-10 (Feb. 27, 1985). 
4 3 Many academic commentators have argued for permitting target managements to delay a 
takeover bid only long enough to conduct an orderly auction so as to maximize the premium re-
ceived by target shareholders. E.g., Bebchuk, supra note 34; Coffee, supra note 8; Gilson, A Struc-
tural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. 
REv. 819 (1981). Other commentators believe that auctions reduce shareholder wealth by reducing 
the number of takeover bids; they would prohibit all defensive tactics. See Easterbrook & Fischel, 
Proper Role, supra note 25, at 1164 & passim. Some commentators (often practicing lawyers) ap-
prove of virtually all defensive tactics. See Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: An 
Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017 (1981); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boar-
droom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979). But the rule of auctioneering seems to be supported by at least a 
plurality of academic commentators. 
44 Indeed, Easterbrook and Fischel tout the lowering of premiums as one of the benefits of their 
proposal, not only because it would benefit acquiring companies, but because it would benefit share-
holders of potential targets by making it more likely that their shares will be acquired at a premium. 
Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 25, at 1174-82. 
45 Although there is some room for disagreement about which tactics are intended solely to 
thwart tender offers, most people probably would agree that these tactics include lock-ups (the prac-
tice of giving a favored bidder, or white knight, an option to acquire stock or crucial assets of the 
target at a bargain price); shark repellents (charter provisions that make a takeover unattractive to a 
bidder by, for example, requiring an impractically high shareholder approval for any merger between 
the company and a person who owns a large part of the company's stock); and greenmail payments, 
see supra note 42. Whether other actions will deter unsolicited tender offers "will in many cases raise 
an issue of causation." American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and 
Recommendations, Reporters' Study No. 1: Transactions in Control3l n.13 (Feb. 22, 1985) [herein-
after ALI]. That an action may diminish the likelihood of future tender offers "should not subject 
such a transaction to special treatment, and the business judgment rule should generally be applica-
ble." Id. at 46. 
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type of such action. Sometimes a target in the heat of a takeover battle 
makes an acquisition obviously intended only to defeat the raider.46 
Such egregious behavior could be prohibited. But the best tender offer 
defense does not defeat a raider, but rather dissuades him from ever mak-
ing a bid. Every acquisition, though, helps deter raids by making a com-
pany larger and more complex.47 Therefore, acquisitions that deter 
tender offers could not be barred without barring all acquisitions, an ob-
viously inappropriate step. 
Stripped of other defenses to tender offers, managers might experi-
ence an eat-or-be-eaten phobia-a fear that to avoid being taken over one 
must make many takeovers oneself, at whatever cost, and thereby grow 
so large and incur so much debt as to discourage raiders.48 Thus, ban-
ning other defenses could multiply unprofitable acquisitions. But it is 
most unlikely that Congress, the state legislatures, or the courts will soon 
ban all defenses to takeovers. 
A rule that encouraged auctions could make matters even worse. 
Denied other defenses to takeovers, corporate managers still would des-
perately seek safety in growth through acquisition. But if every takeover 
involves an auction, the odds escalate that the winner will pay an exces-
sive price. 
These remarks are not intended to disparage proposals to limit de-
fenses to takeovers; they might well benefit shareholders of target compa-
nies and even investors generally.49 But these changes could at the same 
time exacerbate the problem of unprofitable acquisitions. 
B. Requiring Approval by the Acquirer's Shareholders 
Professor Coffee has recommended that the purchaser be required to 
obtain from its shareholders approval of any corporate acquisition above 
a certain size. 50 Neither state laws nor stock exchange regulations re-
quire such approval for most acquisitions.s' At first blush, shareholder 
46 See supra note 23. 
47 See supra text accompanying notes 22-25. 
48 Although there is debate over the extent to which_ size alone discourages tender offers, most 
commentators agree that it does have some effect. See supra notes 22-24. Certainly, corporate man-
agers believe that growth helps them defend against raiders. See supra note 23 (analysts view Chese-
brough-Ponds' acquisition of Stauffer Chemical as an attempt to protect itself from takeovers). 
49 See supra text accompanying notes 10-15. 
50 Coffee, supra note 8, at 1269-72; see also id. at 1269 n.379 and authorities cited therein. 
51 Generally, no approval of the acquiring company's sharholders is required if the transaction is 
structured as a purchase of stock (including a tender offer) or of assets. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 145-46 (5th ed. 1980). Such approval is required only 
if the transaction is structured as a statutory merger or consolidation. !d. at 145. Even then, ap-
proval may be unnecessary unless the acquirer will increase its outstanding stock by some specified 
amount in the transaction. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(f) (1974). Stock exchange rules 
require shareholder approval of any acquisition, however structured, that will increase the acquirer's 
outstanding stock by 20%. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL. (CCH) A-284 
(Jan. 25, 1978). Even with the statutory merger, however, a shareholder vote may be avoided by 
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approval might seem an ideal solution to the problem: shareholders can 
review and reject any unprofitable acquisition. There are problems, how-
ever. First, obtaining the adoption of such requirements would be diffi-
cult. The stock exchanges are private bodies that compete with each 
other and with the over-the-counter market to have corporations list 
with them for trading. They will not readily toughen their requirements 
for shareholder approval of acquisitions if to do so might offend corpo-
rate managements and cause them either not to list on an exchange or to 
delist from it. 52 Nor are state legislatures likely to impose such a re-
quirement. Even if there is no "race to the bottom"53 in other respects, 
states still have a perverse incentive to offer corporate managements laws 
that help ward off tender offers, and thereby attract incorporations and 
the accompanying lucrative franchise fees. Although Congress does not 
face the same competition for franchise fees as do the states, Congress 
traditionally has regulated only corporate disclosure and has left substan-
tive corporate regulation to the states. 
Even if requiring shareholder approval were politically feasible, it 
would impose substantial costs with little benefit. The most obvious 
using a triangular merger, in which the acquired company is merged into a subsidiary of the acquir-
ing company. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra, at 1500. 
52 See Wayne, The Big Board's Fight to Stay on Top, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, !984, § 3, at 1, col. 3. 
Indeed, far from stiffening its listing requirements, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has voted 
to drop its prohibition against a corporation's having multiple classes of common stock with dispa-
rate voting rights. Sterngold, Big Board Ends Equal Vote Rule, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1986, at Dl, col. 
6. It is unlikely that the NYSE would expand its current requirements for shareholder approval of 
acquisitions. See supra note 51. Professor Coffee also recommends revision of a number of stock 
exchange regulations and extensions of these regulations by the SEC to over-the-counter companies. 
See Coffee, supra note 8, at 1255-66. Although these recommendations in general are eminently 
sound, they are designed to curb certain defensive maneuvers by targets, not unwise acquisitions by 
purchasers. 
53 The late Professor William L. Cary created the term "race to the bottom" to describe compe-
tition among the states to attract corporate franchise fees by offering corporation laws that benefitted 
managements by watering shareholder rights down "to a thin gruel." Cary, Federalism and Corpo-
rate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666, 705 (1974). He did not originate the 
idea, however. Justice Brandeis said that "[t]he race was one not of diligence but of laxity." Louis 
K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Others have questioned 
whether such a race exists. They argue that if a state eliminated rights investors take seriously, it 
would become too risky to own stocks of companies incorporated there, and the value of such stocks 
would fall to a level unacceptable to managements. They point out, for example, that the share 
prices of companies do not fall when they reincorporate in Delaware. See Lorie, An Economist's 
Perception 1: A View on the Need to Revise C01poration Statutes, in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE 
STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE 51, 57 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979); Winter, State Law, Share/wider 
Protection. and the Theory of' the Co1poration, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 256-58 (1977); see also Dent, 
supra note 39, at 651 n.154. 
A drop in share price can lead to displacement of management only through a tender offer (or a 
proxy fight, but this is rarely attempted by anyone who does not already control a large block of 
stock). Since even unprofitable acquisitions help immunize managements from takeovers, see supra 
~ext accompanying notes 20-25, managers and states seeking corporation franchise fees may have an 
Incentive to encourage acquisitions despite possible damage to corporate share prices. 
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costs involve preparing and distributing a proxy statement and tabulating 
the responses. Litigation attacking proxy disclosures would occur fre-
quently and often might require resolicitation, especially because of un-
fortunate Supreme Court precedent. 54 By increasing the already 
considerable costs of consummating acquisitions, the requirement would 
tend to discourage acquisitions generally, both profitable and 
unprofitable. 
Moreover, the delays from soliciting shareholder approval could de-
feat even a profitable acquisition. During the wait the target might be 
acquired by another company. Privately owned companies, not needing 
to solicit proxies, would have an unfair advantage in competing with 
public companies. In a friendly acquisition, events during the delay 
might prompt the target to withdraw. In a hostile takeover bid, the tar-
get would use the delay to obstruct the acquisition. 55 
A requirement of shareholder approval for substantial acquisitions 
also would encounter serious drafting problems. Defining the acquisi-
tions to be covered would be difficult. Presumably, it would be done in 
terms of the dollar amount of the acquisition relative to the dollar size of 
the acquirer. Drawing these lines would be tricky; 56 managers would 
seek acquisitions just below the cutoff line. Although such line-drawing 
is necessary, it is bound to be inexact in distinguishing mergers that may 
be highly damaging because the impact of an acquisition does not depend 
solely on its size. Also, many takeover bids result in bidding wars. 
Would shareholders have to approve each new bid? If so, the whole pro-
cess could become hopelessly bogged down. If not, approval might be-
come meaningless-it is impossible to gauge the profitability of an 
acquisition without knowing the price offered. Professor Coffee suggests 
54 See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381-85 (1970) (holding that proxy solicita-
tion concerning a merger violates proxy rules even though transaction is fair); see also TSC Indus., 
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (holding that an omitted fact is material if it 
"would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder" even if it 
would not "have caused [him] to change his vote"). Thus, at least in theory, a vote may be over-
turned even for a defect that did not affect the outcome of the shareholder vote. Lanza v. Drexel & 
Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973). 
55 Even a prohibition on defenses against tender offers could not catch all defensive maneuvers. 
See supra text accompanying notes 45-46. Professor Coffee argues that the delay required to obtain 
shareholder approval "would not need to be extensive," and that the offer could "be commenced 
prior to the shareholder vote and made condi tiona! on shareholder approval." Coffee, supra note 8, 
at 1271. The delay would be at least a few weeks, however-a long time during a takeover contest; 
and if shareholder approval were doubtful, the target's shareholders would hesitate to tender if a 
rival bidder had no such condition to his bid. 
56 Hybrid transactions would further complicate the line-drawing. Consider, for example, a 
tender offer for 51% of the target's stock that probably will be followed by a merger to take out the 
remaining shareholders of the target. Should the size of this transaction be computed by reference 
to the first-step tender offer only, or to both steps? Does the answer depend on the likelihood that 
the second step will occur? Also, how should assumption of the target's debts be treated? Such 
assumption reduces the price the acquirer pays, but may actually increase the risk of the acquisition 
to the acquirer. 
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that shareholder approval could incorporate authority to increase the of-
fer in response to any counterbid. 57 As he recognizes, however, share-
holder ratification of one bid does not imply ratification of a higher bid, 
and most initial bids do not succeed. 58 Shareholders would then be 
forced to choose between rejecting an attractive transaction, or approv-
ing it with the knowledge that they may also be authorizing a different 
and possibly unprofitable transaction. 59 
Even if the drafting problems could be surmounted, the benefits of 
requiring shareholder approval :would be slim. Rarely would a proxy 
fight erupt; even a large shareholder outraged by a proposed transaction 
seldom can afford the high cost of waging a proxy fight, 60 especially since 
even free-spending insurgents rarely defeat management. Shareholders 
generally have an attitude of "rational apathy"; 61 it is easier for the dis-
gruntled shareholder to follow the Wall Street rule and sell his stock than 
to study proxy issues carefully and possibly wage proxy war on manage-
ment. Thus, shareholders generally will receive only management's 
proxy statement, which will of course enthusiastically support the 
proposed transaction. Although the federal proxy rules require full, 
accurate disclosure, 62 management's support will, absent organized op-
position, almost invariably assure shareholder approval. 63 Shareholder 
approval is, therefore, unlikely to prevent many unprofitable mergers. 
Indeed, requiring shareholder approval may have a perverse effect. 
Courts often treat shareholder approval as placing or increasing the bur-
den on the plaintiff to prove that corporate managers breached a fiduci-
ary duty. 64 Thus, shareholder approval actually could facilitate unwise 
5 7 Coffee, supra note 8, at 1270-71. 
5 8 ld. at 1270 & n.383. 
59 Shareholder approval could be bifurcated to cover separately the original deal and an increase 
to meet a counterbid. Not only would this be confusing to shareholders, but seeking approval with-
out disclosure of the terms of the increase would be unfair. It is undesirable to give legal effect to 
such approval. 
60 See Gilson, supra note 43, at 843. 
61 Clark, Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 776, 779 (1979) (citing A. 
DOWNS, AN EcoNOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 265 (1957)). Professors Easterbrook and Fischel 
have explained the economics of this phenomenon. Since no shareholder owns 100% of the shares, 
none has an incentive to invest in information up to the full amount of the possible gains to the 
~orporation from such investment. Indeed, "each voter's optimal investment in information is zero 
If each is sure that the election will come out the same way whether or not he participates." Easter-
brook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & EcoN. 395, 402 (1983); see also Clark, supra, at 
779-83. Institutional shareholders also may be pressured to support harmful changes "to maintain a 
working relationship with incumbent management." DeAngelo & Rice, Antitakeover Charter 
Amendments, II 1. FIN. EcoN. 329, 334 (1983); see also Pickens, Second-Class Stock Impairs Mar-
ket, Wall St. 1., Feb. 13, 1986, at 26, col. I. 
62 SEC Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1984). 
63 It . IS extremely unusual for shareholders to reject a management proposal when there is no 
formal, organized opposition to it. Although instances may exist, the author does not know of any . 
. 
64 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983) (minority shareholder approval 
shifts burden to plaintiff to prove unfairness of freezeout transaction). 
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acquisitions. 
C Accounting Rules 
Professor Coffee also proposes changes in accounting rules so as to 
discourage "those acquisitions most likely to be growth maximizing 
[rather than] those in which the bidder is truly acquiring a troubled 
firm." 65 He would require faster amortization of the goodwill recorded 
when a bidder acquires a company for more than the fair market value of 
its assets. 66 Faster amortization of goodwill would reduce reported earn-
ings (but not taxes), which would discourage acquisitions involving sub-
stantial goodwill. Coffee posits that goodwill more likely "will arise in 
significant amounts in those acquisitions in which an excessive premium 
is paid. "67 The change would not discourage the acquisition of troubled 
companies, "the context where the takeover performs its most socially 
desirable role."68 
The accounting profession is unlikely to adopt this change volunta-
rily, and the SEC has been reluctant to revise major accounting rules. 69 
Even though the change, if made, would be somewhat beneficial, it would 
be a blunt and rather ineffective instrument for deterring unprofitable 
acquisitions. First, although substantial goodwill may be recorded more 
often in unprofitable mergers, there is no evidence that the correlation is 
perfect or even very strong. Goodwill is recorded when the purchase 
price exceeds the fair market value of the assets acquired (as determined 
by the purchaser). Although this generally occurs when the acquired 
company is profitable, such acquisitions are not necessarily made at ex-
cessive premiums. Nor are acquisitions of troubled companies more 
likely to be profitable to the purchaser and therefore to be encouraged. 
Mergers profit the buyer when the value it gains exceeds the price paid. 
One way to profit is to acquire a poorly managed company and improve 
it. In many cases, however, the damage done by poor management may 
be irreversible.70 In such cases, the acquisition may be detrimental even 
though it does not give rise to goodwill. On the other hand, even the 
acquisition of a successful company at a substantial premium over the 
fair market value of its assets may profit the purchaser because of econo-
mies of scale, easier access to capital, or other factors. 71 In this case, the 
65 Coffee, supra note 8, at 1272. 
66 Jd. at 1273-80. 
67 Jd. at 1273. 
68 Jd. at 1275. 
69 Congressman John Dingell has suggested that the SEC has delegated too much oversight 
authority to the accounting profession. He has held hearings at which witnesses have criticized the 
Commission on this score. 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 346 (Feb. 22, 1985). 
70 Coffee, supra note 8, at 1201 & n.l64; Lowenstein, supra note 23, at 305 n.223. 
71 For example, Monsanto's stock rose slightly on the announcement of its proposed acquisition 
of Searle, even though the purchase was proposed to be at a substantjal premium and Searle was a 
successful company. Greenhouse, Monsanto to Acquire G.D. Searle, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1985, Dl, 
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acquisition may involve recording considerable goodwill, but should not 
be discouraged. In short, requiring faster write-off of goodwill is a blunt 
instrument for deterring unprofitable acquisitions. 
It also would be rather ineffective. If management cares about re-
ported earnings, it might circumvent the proposed change by increasing 
the write-up of assets of the acquired company, and thereby reduce the 
goodwill recorded; 72 in fact, the opportunity to write-up assets is an im-
portant incentive to undertake acquisitions. 73 More important, the pro-
posed change will not .affect share prices of acquiting companies. 
Amortization of goodwill does not affect a company's cash flow, taxes, 
operating earnings, or anyth~ng else except certain financial reports. Ac-
counting changes that do not influence actual financial performance do 
not affect share price. 74 The proposed change might affect management 
only by reducing compensation tied to reported earnings. Even if this 
effect is material, it can be avoided by shifting to compensation based on 
other determinants (such as share price) or simply by eliminating write-
off of goodwill from computation of earnings-based compensation. The 
impact of the accounting change on management would then be virtually 
nil.75 
D. Prohibiting Diversifying Acquisitions 
It has been proposed that the problem of excessive premiums can be 
solved by prohibiting diversifying acquisitions. 76 The argument is that 
col. 6, at D4, col. 2. In a more striking case, Philip Morris acquired General Foods, clearly a 
successful company, for $5.8 billion and recorded $2.8 billion of this as goodwill. Blatant empire 
building or self-serving diversification? The market thought not: Philip Morris rose over 2.5% in 
the two days following the announcement of the deals. What's Inevitable and Worth $55 Billion?, 
Bus. WK., Oct. 14, 1985, at 132. 
72 When assets are acquired for more than their book value, the purchaser writes up their value 
on his books to their fair market value as determined by him pursuant to generally accepted account-
ing principles. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 1273. Professor Coffee recognizes that this gives the 
purchaser wide discretion, but he believes that in cases involving large premiums substantial good-
will will remain. Id. at 1273-74. Professor Lowenstein, however, reports that in the management 
buyout of Fred Mayer, Inc., for $420 million cash, there was a considerable write-up of assets-
inventory alone was increased by $46 million-but no more than $9 million of the purchase price 
was allocated to goodwill or other intangible assets that could not be amortized for tax purposes. 
Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 CoLUM. L. REV. 730, 746 (1985). 
73 Depreciation is charged against earnings. Writing up the book value of assets increases the 
amount of depreciation that may be taken, without reducing cash flow. Thus, by an accounting 
convention an acquirer can reduce the income taxes incurred by the acquired company. See Lowen-
stein, supra note 72, at 759-60. 
74 G. FOSTER, FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS (1978); P. GRIFFIN, USEFULNESS TO INVES· 
TORS AND CREDITORS OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY FINANCIAL REPORTING: A REVIEW OF 
EMPIRICAL ACCOUNTING RESEARCH (1982); see infra note 148. 
75 To the extent that there still would be some impact on management's compensation, it often 
would be unfair because an acquisition giving rise to substantial goodwill is not necessarily bad for 
the purchaser. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71. 
76 Note, supra note 20, at 1253. 
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managers try to reduce the risk to their compensation from fluctuating 
corporate earnings by making acquisitions that diversify their companies 
and thereby reduce earnings fluctuations.77 Diversifying or conglomer-
ate mergers, however, rarely produce synergies and are generally disad-
vantageous for the buyer. 78 Therefore, "all mergers that provide no 
benefit other than diversification" would be prohibited; only "synergistic 
combinations of unrelated businesses" would be permitted. 79 AB to the 
latter, management would have to persuade a court that the benefits of 
the merger justify its cost. 80 The net effect "would be to make mergers 
very difficult to achieve."8 t · 
Although there is much to be said for this approach, it has two seri-
ous problems. First, it exaggerates the significance of diversification both 
as the motive for mergers and as the root evil of unprofitable acquisitions. 
Although reducing risk through diversification is one reason for mergers, 
it is not the only reason or even a very important one. To reduce risk 
substantially through diversification would require many more acquisi-
tions than even large public companies generally could hope to make; 
one or two acquisitions produce little reduction in risk. 82 Further, the 
influence of earnings fluctuations in an industry on managers' compensa-
tion can be reduced by tying compensation to share price or other deter-
minants, rather than to earnings. 83 
Moreover, countervailing factors favor acquiring a company in the 
same or related fields. The acquirer will better understand such compa-
nies and thus feel more confident of making an intelligent acquisition and 
running the acquired company. The opportunities for synergy may be 
77 Jd. at 1241-44. 
78 Jd. at 1244-47. 
79 Jd. at 1253. 
80 Jd. at 1252-53. 
81 Jd. at 1253. 
82 [I]nstitutional investors such as mutual funds often maintain over 100 different stocks in 
their portfolios, as well as a variety of corporate and government bonds. Some financial writers 
have estimated that diversification beyond 15 or 20 securities cannot reduce risk by a meaning-
ful amount, and that the quality of the diversification, i.e., the degree of interrelatedness among 
the securities selected, is significantly more important than the quantity. 
V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 17, at 1154. No company can hope to acquire 15 or 20 
companies of its own size even over several years. Moreover, unlike the passive investor, who can 
select 15 or 20 stocks primarily to diversify his portfolio, an acquisitive company's management must 
consider many other factors, such as the availability of companies to be acquired and whether the 
nature of the acquired company's business is such that the acquiring company can manage it without 
disaster. Thus, it is most unlikely that even a conglomerate merger, however defined, see infra text 
accompanying note 88, will be optimal for diversification. 
83 If the securities markets are truly efficient, see infra notes I 09-17, fluctuations in corporate 
earnings due to unavoidable but temporary vicissitudes will be recognized as such and have little 
effect on the corporation's share price. It bas become quite common to tie part of managers' com-
pensation to share price. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 51, at 647-50 (discussion of 
stock appreciation rights and stock options). Compensation also could be tied to the corporation's 
performance as compared with other firms in the industry, and thereby further reduce the impact of 
industry fluctuations. 
792 
80:777 (1986) Unprofitable Mergers 
greater for companies in the same or related fields. 84 Thus, many merg-
ers, if not most, are of companies in the same or related fields. 85 A more 
important reason for acquisitions than diversification is empire building, 
to increase prestige and perquisites and ward off raiders. 86 It is unneces-
sary for these purposes that a merger be conglomerate. Indeed, the very 
concept of a diversifying or conglomerate merger would be hard to define 
precisely enough to determine whether many mergers were within the 
definitionP Any reasonable definition of diversifying mergers would ex-
clude many mergers that actually have occurred, 88 however, which fur-
ther shows that diversification is not a primary motive for mergers. 
Furthermore, not all conglomerate mergers (however defined) are 
unprofitable for buyers; nor are all nonconglomerate mergers profita-
ble.89 A conglomerate merger may produce better management and re-
duce the cost of capital and the risk of bankruptcy.90 To winnow the 
84 Coffee, supra note 8, at 1213-14. Coffee suggests that another reason for acquiring a company 
in the same or related fields may be to acquire a company that can be subdivided among existing 
divisions of the acquirer, rather than operated as an independent division, so as to expand opportuni-
ties for promotion of incumbent executives of the acquirer. I d. at 1214. 
85 See id. at 1213-15. 
86 See supra text accompanying notes 20-25. 
87 The article advancing this recommendation never attempts to define the concept except for 
the rather tautological statement that a conglomerate acquisition is one "in which two unrelated 
businesses are combined." Note, supra note 20, at 1245. 
88 The article advancing this recommendation states that "[t]he antitrust Jaws substantially im-
pede all horizontal and vertical mergers." ld. at 1253. This is false: the antitrust laws prohibit only 
mergers that threaten to reduce competition. See Clayton Act, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (Supp. 1984). 
Horizontal and vertical mergers have been facilitated by the relaxation of merger guidelines under 
the Reagan Administration. See 1982 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493 
( 1982). These guidelines afford "much greater tolerance of vertical and conglomerate mergers than 
was found in either the Justice Department's 1968 Merger Guidelines ... or in the case law." Cohen 
& Sullivan, The Herjindahl-Hirschman Index and the New Antitrust Merger Guidelines: Concentrat-
ing on Concentration, 62 TEX. L. REv. 453, 456 (1983). Thus, not all mergers permitted by the 
antitrust laws are diversifying mergers. 
Many major acquisitions are not conglomerate. Some nonconglomerate mergers are profitable. 
See Do Mergers Really Work?, Bus. WK., June 3, 1985, at 88 (successful mergers "usually involve 
companies in closely related businesses"). Some are not. See infra note 89 (Internorth-Houston 
Natural Gas and Rorer-Revlon). 89 Many if not most mergers are profitable for the purchaser. See supra note 8. Specifically, 
conglomerate mergers can work. See Do Mergers Really Work?, supra note 88, at 88, 90 (Sara Lee's 
acquisition of Hanes). Announcement of GE's agreement to acquire RCA was followed by a slight 
increase in GE's stock price. See New York Stock Exchange Consolidated Trading Reports, Dec. II, 
1985 (GE stock rose 1/4 to 67 7/8). Thus, an approach that would "make mergers very difficult to 
achieve," Note, supra note 20, at 1253, would thwart many profitable acquisitions. On the other 
hand, even the acquisition of a company in the same industry can be unprofitable. Disclosure of 
Internorth's plan to acquire Houston Natural Gas caused Internorth's stock to plummet by 10%, a 
loss of $250 million in Internorth's market value. Cole, Gas Pipeline Giants Agree to a Merger, supra 
~ate 7, at DI, col. 5. The stock of Rorer, a pharmaceuticals company, fell 8% on announcement of 
lis acquisition of Revlon's prescription drug business. Crudele, supra note 7, at 29, 3, col. I. 90 The last point is made by Brudney & Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 
HARV. L. REv. 997, 1060n.l61 (1981). They also note that use of retained earnings for a conglom-
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good merger from the bad, some test more precise than the conglomer-
ate/nonconglomerate dichotomy is necessary. Indeed, the proposal in 
question implicitly recognizes this by recommending that a court weigh 
the alleged benefits of a conglomerate acquisition against the costs.91 The 
goal "would be to make mergers very difficult to achieve. "92 But courts 
could not easily weigh the arguments of managers and dissident share-
holders about the benefits and detriments of a particular merger.93 For 
example, how is a court to assess a claim that a merger will improve the 
management of the acquired company?94 Moreover, the logistics of such 
an inquiry would clash with business procedures for consummating 
mergers. To weigh claims such as improved management would require 
lengthy pretrial discovery, a trial, and appeals. If mergers were routinely 
restrained pending final disposition, the resulting delay would itself 
thwart many mergers, regardless of their merits. If mergers were al-
lowed to be consummated pending litigation, suits attacking them could 
seek only damages, and thereby raise all the problems that have made 
derivative suits for damages ineffective.95 
Despite the criticisms of the three proposals-requiring approval of 
the buyer's shareholders, accounting changes, and prohibiting diversify-
ing acquisitions-each has strengths, and any or all of them might 
ameliorate the current state of affairs. They might be supportable if no 
superior approach were available. There is, however, a superior 
approach. 
Ill. A MARKET-BASED APPROACH TO CURBING UNPROFITABLE 
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 
A. The Proposed Approach 
A superior solution to the problem of unprofitable corporate acqui-
sitions is surprisingly simple but not, I think, simplistic: a court should 
enjoin as corporate waste or a breach of fiduciary duty any acquisition 
the disclosure of which causes a material decline in the price of the pro-
posed buyer's common stock. 
Several details of this proposal require explication. First, what is a 
material decline? The answer depends in part on such factors as the 
price of the stock and the size of the purchaser. 96 Generally, a court 
erate merger may produce tax treatment for shareholders that is preferable to the tax consequences 
of a distribution of earnings as dividends. I d. 
91 Note, supra note 20, at 1253. 
92 Id. 
93 The author of the proposal concedes this. See id. at 1252. 
94 The author of the proposal states that such a benefit is "unlikely to be realized in most situa-
tions." Id. 
95 See infra text accompanying notes 103-04. 
96 For example, a decline of half a point in the price of shares trading at $10 would be more 
significant than the same half-point decline in the price of shares trading at $50--5% versus I%. 
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should disregard a minimal decline, not only because the decline may 
have been caused by factors other than disclosure of the merger, but also 
because such a small decline may not warrant judicial intervention. The 
plaintiff should bear the burden of proving a material decline in price. 
Second, how can it be shown that disclosure of the proposed acquisi-
tion caused the drop in share price? Prices of actively traded stocks 
change constantly in response to many factors, and it is not always possi-
ble to isolate the reasons for a price change. Many extraneous factors 
("noise," as economists call it) can be factored out, however, by compar-
ing the performance of a stock to the performance of similar. issues of 
stock during the same period.97 The defendants should bear the burden 
of proving that the decline was not caused by disclosure of the acquisi-
tion both because they have better access to the relevant information and 
because it is reasonable to presume that the announcement of the merger 
caused the decline. 9 8 
Third, over what span of time should the change in price be mea-
sured? In most cases this will pose no problem because markets react 
very quickly to new information such as the announcement of a 
merger;99 in such cases a few hours or at most a day will suffice. In some 
cases the market reaction may spread over a longer period because the 
market is alerted in steps, such as rumors or leaks, announcement of 
agreement in principle, rumors of competing offers, and final announce-
ment. In a hostile tender offer in particular, the market's prediction of 
success or failure, and the corresponding reaction of share price, may 
evolve slowly. 100 Even in these cases, however, the final announcement 
of an agreement or a successful takeover usually is important news, so 
that courts generally should not intervene unless this announcement 
causes a material price drop.l01 
Also, a decline of, for example, one point would be more significant for a company with 100 million 
shares outstanding than for a company with one million shares outstanding; the latter would indicate 
a total loss in value of $1 million, while the former means a loss of $100 million. In general, courts 
could follow the standard of materiality adopted by the Supreme Court for disclosure under the 
federal securities laws: "there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would con-
sider it important." TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
97 See Easterbrook & Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. Cin. L. REV. 611, 
627-30 (1985) (discussing techniques for factoring "noise" out of individual stock price movements). 
98 
"If all the critical information comes out at once, .then the full change in price at the time of 
r:lease (after taking out the market) may be attributed with reasonable assurance to the informa-
tion." I d. at 627. 
99 See infra text accompanying notes 109-12. 
10
° For example, rumors that lntemorth would acquire Houston Natural Gas caused lnternorth's 
stock to fall over 3%. Cole, Houston Natural Bid Seen, supra note 7, at Dl, col. 6. 
101 One c . · · F I "f f . . . I 
. an Imagme exceptions. or examp e, 1 announcement o an agreement m pnnc1p e 
tnggers a steep drop in the acquirer's share price, a court should enjoin the merger even if a final 
announcement did not further affect the stock price. Although the final public announcement gener-
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The proposal contemplates that, with rare exceptions, 102 only in-
junctive relief will be granted. There are several reasons for this. First, 
although one usually can determine whether a merger announcement has 
materially reduced share price, a damage award requires the much more 
difficult task of measuring the decline. More important, damage awards 
would run headlong into some problems that have long plagued deriva-
tive suits: the possibility of indemnification and insurance reduces the 
deterrent threat of damages; it is difficult to prove that an individual of-
ficer or director caused, or could have prevented, the loss; liability in 
damages generally requires some culpability, 103 which is often hard to 
prove as to business decisions (for example, a defendant may claim reli-
ance on others); and, because an award of full damages would be draco-
nian, courts tend to nullify liability by fin.ding ways to rule against the 
plaintiff. 104 Injunctions avoid all these problems. 
Although only injunctive relief generally would be available under 
this proposal, disgruntled shareholders will have ample incentive to sue. 
The hope of avoiding a substantial loss in their investments may itself 
motivate large shareholders to sue. 105 Moreover, courts have long 
awarded plaintiffs attorneys' fees in successful derivative suits and share-
ally will be a crucial event, courts may exercise their usual discretion in factfinding to consider other 
events. 
Since this proposal provides for injunctive relief only, it is unnecessary to measure the magni-
tude of the decline except to determine that it is material. Could leaks provoke inside trading that 
would drive down the acquiring cOJ;npany's stock price to the point where the actual announcement 
of the deal would produce no further effect? Probably not. Although much inside trading is not 
detected, it remains illegal, and this probably is sufficient to deter most inside trading except when 
the gap between the current price and the expected price is quite large. Thus, inside trading proba-
bly will not eliminate that gap. 
A problem also could arise if the defendants alleged that rumors and preliminary announce-
ments about the merger caused the buyer's stock price to rise by, say, $5 per share, and that on final 
announcement the price fell $2 per share because the market viewed the merger as profitable, though 
less so than had been anticipated. In this case an injunction presumably would cause the share price 
to drop $3 more to the prerumor price. Defendants should be permitted to try to prove this claim, 
but should bear the burden of proving it. 
102 In some cases it might be possible for a court to order rescission of a merger that already has 
occurred, but usually the affairs of the constituent companies quickly become so intertwined that 
rescission would be an administrative nightmare. Also, if the acquired company is publicly owned, it 
would be impossible to recover payments to its shareholders. 
103 The standard of culpability in duty-of-care cases is a matter of some confusion. Many state 
statutes use "prudent man" language, suggesting an ordinary negligence standard. MODEL Bus. 
CORP. AcT§ 35 (1979) ("with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use 
under similar circumstances"). Some courts have-enunciated or hinted at a much more lenient stan-
dard, such as recklessness or bad faith. See Dent, supra note 39, at 646. The Delaware Supreme 
Court recently has applied a gross negligence standard. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 
(Del. 1985). 
104 See Dent, supra note 39, at 650, 652-54. 
105 Bringing such a suit would be feasible because it would be much less expensive than waging_ a 
proxy fight, but see supra text accompanying notes 60-63, especially given the simple procedure 
contemplated by this proposal. 
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holder class actions, even if no damages are awarded. 106 Justifying a sub-
stantial award of fees should be easy when the action has averted a 
substantial loss. 
This proposal has many advantages over the other proposals dis-
cussed above. Unlike the others, it is not a blunt instrument; it prohibits 
only acquisitions that are clearly unprofitable to the buyer and leaves 
others untouched. 107 Also unlike the others, it would be effective, since 
disfavored acquisitions would not merely be indirectly discouraged but 
enjoined. The proposal would be simple and inexpensive to implement. 
Since relief would be available only when the buyer's share price has 
dropped noticeably, frivolous suits should be rare and, if they are filed, 
should be easily dismissed. Because the factual issues will be few and 
relatively uncomplicated and relief will be limited to an injunction, trials 
should be brief. Indeed, in most cases a court should be able to decide 
quickly whether to grant a preliminary injunction, and as a practical 
matter this decision often will dispose of the entire case. 108 
B. Possible Objections to the Proposal 
1. Undue Reliance on Short-Term Market Reactions.-Probably 
the most serious possible objection to my proposal is that it relies exces-
sively on-one might claim it idolatrizes-the stock market's short-term 
reaction to a transaction. The market is not perfect at evaluating securi-
ties; if it were, including predicting all future events, stock prices would 
almost never change. 109 In a particular case when the purchaser's share 
price has dropped, the market might conclude after reflection and per-
haps receipt of additional information that the acquisition was profitable 
for the buyer, and the buyer's share price would then rise above its prean-
nouncement level. Indeed, the author admits to being haunted by a spec-
ter: For the first time a court is persuaded to adopt this proposal, and 
immediately after it enters an injunction against the merger under attack, 
the price of the buyer's shares drops several points. 
106 Courts have awarded attorneys' fees even when plaintiffs ultimately lost the case but along the 
way vindicated certain shareholder rights. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389-90 
(1970). 
107 See infra text accompanying notes 109-28 (discussion of argument that the proposal would 
not accurately indentify profitable and unprofitable acquisitions). 
108 If a preliminary injunction is granted, the deal often will collapse because of delay and the 
strong possibility that it eventually will be permanently enjoined. Another possibility is that the 
transaction could be renegotiated at a lower price that would be profitable to the buyer as well as to 
:h: ac~uired company, at which point the preliminary injunction could be lifted. If a preliminary 
IDJu.nctlOn is denied, the merger may well be consummated before a trial can take place, so that 
eq~~~able relief generally would be impossible. See supra note 102. 
( Levmore, Efficient Markets and Puzzling Intermediaries, 70 VA. L. REV. 645, 647-48 (1984) 
st.ock m.arket is "a reliable indicator of its own future," though "not necessarily 'correct' "). Stock 
;;ces still would change in a perfect market to reflect stock splits or payment of dividends, even 
ough these had always been anticipated. 
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This nightmare could become real, but probably would not. The 
stock market is efficient-public information circulates rapidly and stock 
prices react quickly to it. 110 Indeed, "prices react so rapidly to new in-
formation that there is no consistent progression of prices as information 
circulates, but ... prices follow a random walk; i.e., past movements of 
prices do not foretell the direction of future movements." 111 Some have 
criticized the efficient market and random walk hypotheses. 112 Professor 
Lowenstein, for example, argues that the market efficiently determines 
stock prices only for trading, not for takeovers. 113 None of the criticisms 
suggests any defect in the stock market's reaction to mergers, however, 
and there is no reason to suspect any such defect. 114 Nor is there any 
evidence that declines in buyers' stock prices after announcements are 
routinely followed by a rebound. Quite the contrary, following acquisi-
tions acquiring companies may tend to underperform the market. 115 In 
110 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 97, at 628; Kripke, A Search for a Meaningful Securities 
Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus. LAW. 293, 307 (1975). 
Ill !d. at 31!. 
112 Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. EcoN. 95, 95 
(1978); accord Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 
549-51, 555 n.26 (1984), and authorities cited therein. 
113 Professor Lowenstein believes that the efficient market hypothesis is flawed generally and es-
pecially so in valuing targets in mergers and takeovers because the stock market prices stocks only 
for trading purposes; it does not even seek to reflect the "intrinsic" value of the entire firm. Lowen-
stein, supra note 23, at 274-309. He points out that many investors and corporate managers behave 
as if they do not believe the efficient market hypothesis. Id. at 288-89. In particular, he argues that 
institutional investors, who now dominate stock market trading, are preoccupied with short-term 
performance. Id. at 280 n.127, 300-04. 
114 Even if Lowenstein is correct that the stock market determines prices only for trading, not for 
takeovers, see supra note 113, the market for the acquirer's stock is a trading market both before and 
after announcement of the merger. The defect, if it exists, casts doubt on the attractiveness of the 
merger to the acquired company-a large premium does not prove attractiveness because the preof-
fer stock market price did not reflect the "intrinsic" value of the target-but not for the acquiring 
company, and Lowenstein does not suggest otherwise. To prove the reliability of the stock market's 
reaction reflected in the acquirer's stock price, it is not essential that the stock market be in any 
cosmic sense right, but only that it be unbiased in that "it does not systematically overshoot or 
undershoot the change that ultimately will be deemed merited on the basis of more leisurely contem-
plation of the new information." Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 97, at 628. Neither Lowenstein 
nor anyone else suggests that for this purpose it is not unbiased. Similarly, the alleged (and highly 
dubious) preoccupation of institutional investors with short-term performance would not rule out 
reliance on the share price movements of acquiring companies unless it were shown that mergers 
impaired acquiring companies' performance in the short term but not the long. Again there is no 
evidence of this; nor does Lowenstein claim any. Moreover, the evidence (admittedly sketchy) sug-
gests that the long-term performance of acquisitive companies is weak. See infra note 115. This 
further suggests that defects in the efficient market hypothesis, if any, do not account for the frequent 
declines in the share price of acquiring companies. 
115 SeeM. SALTER & W. WEINHOLD, DIVERSIFICATION THROUGH ACQUISITION: STRATEGIES 
FOR CREATING ECONOMIC VALUE 27-32 (1979); Gort & Hogarty, New Evidence on Mergers, 13 J. 
L. & EcoN. 167, 177 (1970); Hogarty, The Profitability of Corporate Mergers, 43 J. Bus. 317, 325-26 
(1970); Langtieg, An Application of a Three-Factor Performance Index to Measure Stockholder Gains 
from Mergers, 6 J. FIN. EcoN. 365 (1978); Lowenstein, supra note 23, at 289-90; Malatesta, supra 
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some cases the postmerger price will rebound, but in others it will fail-
in short, random walks; "each day's market-clearing price is the best 
indicator of future prices."116 Thus, any share appreciation following an 
initial decline should be presumed to be due to factors other than the 
merger. 117 The defendants might show that the price rebound resulted 
from the release of new information about the merger. Unless the new 
information concerns new terms for the merger, however, the rebound 
should be presumed the result of other forces, especially if the acquired 
company is publicly held.11s 
Reliance on market efficiency often is reflected in the securities laws 
already. For example, in computing damages courts often refer to the 
market price of a security as establishing its value, and most courts now 
accept the fraud-on-the-market theory. 119 This makes sense only if mar-
kets are believed to be efficient and unbiased. 
Might one of the parties deceive the market? Might the acquirer, 
for example, withhold bullish information about its plans for the target 
so as not to be compelled (by negotiation or competing bid) to pay a 
higher price, and thereby trick the stock market into denigrating the 
merger? Even if the acquirer were willing and able to do this prior to 
reaching an agreement, the incentive to do so would mostly vanish once 
agreement was reached. 12° For many acquisitions the federal securities 
laws require full disclosure of the acquirer's plans for the target. 121 More 
note 8, at 172-75; Mason & Goudzwaard, Performance of Conglomerate Firms: A Portfolio Approach, 
31 J. FIN. 39, 45 (1976); Do Mergers Really Work?, supra note 88, at 88, 89 ("there is growing 
evidence that mergers and acquisitions for the most part do not work out"); Nordhaus, The Vanity 
of the Takeover Game, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1982, §3, at 9, col. 1. 
116 Levmore, supra note 109, at 647. 
1!? See Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 
Bus. LAW. 1733, 1742 (1981) (only valid basis for comparison is stock price "immediately after" an 
event; at any later date, "many events have influenced the price of the stock .... The.number of 
possible causes of price changes is almost infinite."). The initial price drop should be presumed due 
to announcement of the merger. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98. 
118 If the acquired company is publicly held, information about it is already publicly available, 
and any additional announcement about the company probably is already known and factored into 
market values. 
119 For example, in computing damages some courts have excluded the part of the securities' 
price decline attributable to a decline in the market generally. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. 
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 586-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). In inside trading cases, the "true" value of the 
stock is fixed at the time the inside information is published and absorbed; any price changes thereaf-
ter are borne by the inside trader for as long as he owns the stock, rather than being added to or 
deducted from his damages. SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983) (en bane); see Easter-
~rook & Fischel, supra note 97, at 646-48; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 10, at 708 n.28 (grow-
Ing use of efficient market hypothesis in computation of damages and acceptance of fraud-on-the-
market theory). 
120 The announcement of a merger usually includes pronouncements of how attractive the deal is 
for both sides. 
121 If the acquisition is made with stock or other securities, the securities would have to be regis-
tered under the 1933 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (Supp. 1985). A tender offer must comply with the 
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important, it is unlikely that the acquirer would have material nonpublic 
information. When the target company is public (as is usually the case; 
we already assume that the acquiring company is public), the market 
should already know of any possible synergy between the merger part-
ners. Moreover, if the acquirer has a history of successful acquisitions, 
the market may applaud the deal even if it does not perceive the synergy. 
If there is inside information, it often leaks out.122 
Suppose the acquirer had managed to fool the market into overvalu-
ing its securities, perhaps even concealing its impending bankruptcy. 
The market then might deprecate an announced merger even though that 
merger would benefit the acquirer, perhaps even offering its only hope of 
survival. Although one cannot categorically deny this possibility, it is 
unlikely. The acquirer would have to convince the market that it was not 
only .solvent but so profitable that the merger would seriously damage it; 
this is major-league deception. The acquirer's management would have 
to hide its true financial condition not only from the investing public, but 
also from its suppliers, creditors, accountants, the SEC, and the acquired 
company. To maintain the charade would be not only difficult but also 
illegal as to the acquirer's shareholders123 and, at least in a noncash ac-
quisition, which this presumably would be, 124 to the shareholders of the 
acquired company, also. 125 Even ifthe acquiring company accomplished 
all this, one hardly could bewail an injunction against the merger. The 
injunction would deprive the acquirer of only a potential gain from de-
ception and would, in a noncash deal, spare the acquired company's 
shareholders from unfair and illegal damage. 
In a hostile takeover attempt the raider's share price could also fall 
Williams Act, including filings with the SEC and disclosure to the target's shareholders. IS U.S.C. 
§§ 78m(d), 78n(d) (Supp. 1985). 
122 Studies repeatedly have shown that stock prices rise (fall) prior to the public announcement of 
good (bad) news. This suggests widespread inside trading. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra 
note 51, at 728 ("stock prices often move dramatically immediately preceding public announcement 
of important views"; leaks are common) (emphasis in original). 
123 Any knowingly untrue public statement by management would violate rule JOb-S and other 
federal securities Jaws. A public issuer is required to file public reports quarterly, see Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(a)(2), 15 U.S. C.§ 78m(a)(2) (Supp. 1984), so that deception cannot long 
be maintained by silence alone. In addition, the SEC believes that public companies have an affirma-
tive duty to disclose material developments even when not filing a periodic report, and there is some 
support for this position in the cases. See Bauman, Rule JOb-5 and the C01paratian 's Affirmative 
Duty to Disclose, 67 GEO. L.J. 935 (1979). 
124 Although a company in good financial condition may make an acquisition to rid itself of cash 
that makes it a potential takeover candidate, see supra text accompanying note 24, a company in 
weak financial condition rarely would use earnings or borrowed funds. Therefore, the acquisition 
probably will be financed with securities of the acquirer. 
125 An acquisition with securities would constitute a sale of securities to shareholders of the ac-
quired company, T. HAZEN, supra note 40, at 164, and would bring into play state and federal 
securities Jaws against deception in connection with the sale of securities, including Securities Act of 
1933, §§ 12(2) and 17(a), IS U.S.C. §§ 771 and 77q (Supp. 1984), and rule lOb-S, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240. JOb-5 (1984). 
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through a "bear raid" by the target-that is, massive sales or short sales 
of the raider's stock by the target. Even if a bear raid were successful, 
defendants could prove this as a defense. More important, a bear raid is 
unlikely for two reasons. First, it would be illegal; several statutes and 
rules under the 1934 Act prohibit manipulation of securities markets, 
including transactions designed to depress a stock's price. 126 Second, a 
bear raid could be extremely costly but still fail. If the target's sales 
drive down the price of the bidder's stock, other investors have an incen-
tive to snap up the newly undervalued stock, and thereby drive its price 
back up. The target would then have incurred substantial transaction 
costs and probably trading losses without ultimately depressing the bid-
der's stock price. 
The market can err, but this is not an adequate reason to reject the 
proposal. A court would be ill-positioned to decide whether the market's 
disapproval of a merger is a mistake. Defendants can always hire experts 
to testify that it is a mistake, and the defendants' generally greater re-
sources favor them in making an attractive case. But unlike expert wit-
nesses at a trial, investors in the market must put their money where 
their mouths are, and their collective judgment is the best index of the 
profitability of a merger. "[V]aluation techniques that do not rely on 
market prices are notoriously arbitrary. Appraisers-be they judges, ju-
ries, arbitrators, or commentators-fare poorly in attempting to fix asset 
values, opportunity costs, or the values of earning streams, because these 
notions are themselves derivative of market prices."127 In the attempt to 
second guess the market, the best would be the enemy of the good: 128 
although the proposal advanced here may produce occasional mistakes, 
an attempt to avoid these mistakes by conducting a lengthy trial on the 
wisdom of a merger would not only make procedures cumbersome but 
also ultimately produce many more errors. 
2. Inconsistency with Current Law.-It may be argued that the 
proposal advanced here is inconsistent with current law. To some extent 
that is clearly true: the proposal clashes with the few cases dealing with 
unprofitable acquisitions. 129 It is, however, consistent with fundamental 
126 E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a), 78j, 78n(e), 78o(c) (Supp. 1985); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.14e-1 
(1985); seeR. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SECURITIES REGULATION 675 
(5th ed. 1982). 
127 
Levmore, supra note 109, at 656 (footnote omitted); see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 97, 
at 626-31 (discussing use of market price to measure damages). 
128 Th . . . . 
. us, cn!Jcism of this approach may be another example of the "Nirvana Fallacy of asserting 
that If markets are 'imperfect' then regulation must be better." Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory 
Disclosure and Lhe Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669, 700 (1984). More generally, the 
Nirvana Fallacy is "the belief that if a cost or flaw in existing affairs can be identified, it must follow 
~at some other state of affairs (the 'remedy') is better." Easterbrook, Breaking Up Is Hard To Do, 
EGULATION 25, 26 (Nov.-Dec. 1981) 
129 . 
See supra text accompanying notes 36-41. 
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principles of corporate law. Corporate officers and directors owe a duty 
to act loyally and with reasonable prudence. 130 A hostile market reac-
tion to a corporate acquisition might itself be deemed strong evidence of 
imprudence, especially given the frequency of unprofitable acquisitions. 
Although suits alleging lack of due care generally succumb to the busi-
ness judgment defense, recent cases show that the duty of care still has 
some life. 131 It is not unthinkable that a court could find that a proposed 
acquisition violates the duty of care, especially if only an injunction were 
sought. 132 
In reviewing alleged breaches of the duty of loyalty, courts are less 
deferential to corporate managers. Although the tests vary, a common 
version is the "entire fairness" standard, which requires the defendant 
managers to prove the entire fairness of the transaction under attack. 133 
Applying this standard, a court easily could hold that an unprofitable 
acquisition was not entirely fair to the buyer, especially if only an injunc-
tion were sought. 
Shareholder attacks against unprofitable acquisitions generally have 
been tested not under the duty of loyalty but under the duty of care, 
resulting in the application of the more lenient business judgment stan-
dard. The reason for this is that the acquisition, like other maneuvers to 
deter takeovers, is not a transaction to which the managers are parties or 
which directly and immediately affects their compensation. 134 This ap-
proach is not immutable, however. Only in the last fifteen years or so 
(approximately since the adoption of the Williams Act) have hostile take-
overs flourished and, therefore, have defenses to takeovers evolved. To 
no surprise, courts initially reviewed these maneuvers under their usual 
doctrines of fiduciary duty and characterized these cases as involving 
only the duty of care. 135 But awareness has grown that managements 
have a strong personal interest in transactions affecting corporate control 
and that these transactions should not be treated as ordinary business 
activities entitled to the benefit of the business judgment rule. Some 
courts, for example, have held certain defensive maneuvers to violate fi-
130 H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 28, at § 231. 
131 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (directors held liable for grossly negli-
gent approval of takeover bid). 
132 See supra text accompanying notes 102-04; cf Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.), 
aff'd per curiam, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. Sup. 1974) (sale of subsidiary for grossly inadequate price 
preliminarily enjoined but for plaintiff's inability to post security of $25 million). 
133 Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977) ("a majority stockholder standing on 
both sides of a merger transaction, has 'the burden of establishing its entire fairness' to the minority 
stockholders"); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (in transaction between par-
ent and fiduciary, "the test of intrinsic fairness ... is applied"). 
134 Growth to justify larger compensation may be a principal motive for acquisitions, see supra 
text accompanying note 20, but an acquisition does not give rise to any legal right to larger 
compensation. 
135 See, e.g., Chelf v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 506, 199 A.2d 548, 555 {1964) (directors can 
justify greenmail payments "by showing good faith and reasonable investigation"). 
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duciary duties. 136 Because corporate acquisitions tend to entrench in-
cumbent management, it would be consistent with the duty of loyalty if a 
court applied the entire fairness standard to a corporate acquisition. If 
management could not prove the fairness of a transaction that depressed 
the shareholders' investment, an injunction would be appropriate. This 
is precisely what this proposal contemplates. In sum, the proposal ad-
vanced by this Article does not stray far from the mainstream of current 
law. 
3. The Feedback Loop Problem.-In theory, the proposal could be 
sabotaged by its own success. If the market confidently predicted that a 
court would enjoin an unwise merger, the acquirer's stock price would 
not fall and no injunction would issue. 137 Although this feedback loop 
problem is interesting theoretically, it should not be significant in prac-
tice. If the stock market were functioning perfectly it still would react to 
the unwise merger. Recognizing that a court would not enjoin the 
merger if the buyer's stock price did not fall, owners of the stock would 
sell. If the price fell to the point at which a court certainly would enjoin 
the merger, investors would bid the price up. Equilibrium would be the 
price at which the market could not predict either a grant or a denial of 
an injunction-that is, the borderline between a material and an immate-
rial decline in price. If we assume an unbiased market, approximately 
half of these unwise mergers would be enjoined. 
Even enthusiasts of the efficient market hypothesis do not claim 
such perfect stock markets. More important, this scenario posits a per-
fectly functioning, frictionless judicial process, so that only the magni-
tude of the decline in share price would determine the outcome. But the 
judici81 process is invariably imperfect; litigation always entails costs ·and 
uncertainties. These costs and uncertainties make it unlikely that the 
market would disregard an unwise merger in the confident expectation 
that it will be enjoined. 
Even if the feedback loop problem did occur in a few cases, how-
ever, the principal benefits of the proposal would survive. Like most 
136 See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984) (target enjoined from 
voting shares issued to its subsidiary and ESOP to thwart takeover); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil 
Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981) (crown jewel option enjoined); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. 
Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (crown jewel asset sale); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings Inc., Corp. L. Guide (CCH) ~ 11,738 (Del. Sup. 1986) ("asset lock-up" option and 
"no shop" clause enjoined); see Coffee, supra note 8, at 1252 n.320. 
Positions between the business judgment rule and duty of loyalty are possible. The drafters of 
the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project would treat takeover defenses as in-
volving an intermediate third category of fiduciary duty. For example, the reporters would permit 
many defenses against tender offers if approved by disinterested shareholders. ALI, supra note 45, at 
~4-35, 37, 42, 50, 52. This contrasts with the traditional approach, which permits ordinary business 
JUdgments even without shareholder approval, but forbids interested transactions (at least if unfair) 
even if approved by disinterested shareholders. 
137 I thank my colleague, Jim Brook, for bringing this possibility to my attention. 
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rules of law, the proposal would operate primarily by deterring misdeeds 
rather than by remedying them after they occur. Deterrence will not be 
crippled simply because an unwise merger occasionally escapes judicial 
censure. 138 
4. Improbability of Adoption.-It can be argued that adoption of 
this Article's proposal is improbable. Professor Coffee says that "few 
prospects appear more utopian" than that state courts will curb defensive 
tactics against tender offers. 139 The scholar performs a useful function by 
pointing a better path for the law, however, even if the law is not ready to 
follow that path. Moreover, prospects for adoption of this proposal are 
not necessarily so farfetched. If a legislature acts, it can adopt this pro-
posal a:s easily as other proposals that have been advanced. A preceding 
section shows, moreover, that the proposal is not so far from the current 
state of the law that its adoption is unthinkable. 140 Its adoption by the 
courts would be no more surprising than several recent decisions in the 
corporate area. 141 
5. Discrimination Against Public Companies.-lt might be argued 
that this proposal discriminates against publicly held companies because 
138 The feedback loop problem could be avoided if courts enjoined any merger that did not cause 
the purchaser's stock price to rise. This would mean prohibiting some mergers that were not unprof-
itable in order to be sure of prohibiting those that were. It is not clear that the advantages of this 
approach would outweigh the detriments. 
139 Coffee, supra note 8, at 1252. It is true that the courts, especially in Delaware, often have 
upheld defensive tactics that seriously reduce the possibility that shareholders will receive an unso-
licited tender offer. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. Sup. 1985) (upholding 
issuance of "poison pill" preferred stock); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 
Sup. 1985). Even Delaware, however, has not invariably upheld defenses against tender offers. See 
supra note 136 and cases cited therein. Professor Coffee fears that if some states curbed defenses 
against tender offers, corporations simply would migrate to more lenient states. Coffee, supra note 8, 
at 1252. Many commentators have doubted whether there is a race to the bottom among the states. 
They argue that the interest of both the states and managers is not to reduce shareholder rights to 
nothing (which would cause investor confidence and share prices to fall), but to apply the rules that 
investors and managers would agree upon if they could negotiate without transaction costs. See 
Lorie, supra note 53; Winter, supra note 53. But if the states knowingly have failed to protect 
shareholder interests, the problem probably rests more with state legislators, who are concerned with 
short-term politics and who have, for example, spawned a host of detrimental state antitakeover 
laws, than with state judges, who often have produced decisions surprisingly favorable to sharehold-
ers, see supra notes 131 & 136; infra note 141. Thus, to focus on state courts seems somewhat 
misguided. 
140 See supra text accompanying notes 129-36. 
141 For example, Delaware, long castigated for leading a supposed "race to the bottom" in state 
corporation laws, has produced several notable decisions favorable to shareholders in recent years. 
See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (directors held to have breached duty of care); 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (evaluation techniques for appraisal proceedings 
liberalized); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (limiting directors' power to 
terminate derivative suits); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) (shareholders may 
seek to enjoin unfair squeezeout). 
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it inherently excludes acquisitions by private companies from its prohibi-
tion. The criticism is groundless. First, the proposal benefits public 
companies by freeing them from unwise acquisitions. Thus, it is bizarre 
to say that the proposal discriminates against public companies; if any-
thing, it discriminates in their favor. Moreover, it is most unlikely that a 
private company would make an unprofitable acquisition because it lacks 
the incentive to do so. In public companies the motive for acquisitions, 
even if unprofitable, lies largely in insulating the company from hostile 
takeovers. 142 Private companies are not subject to hostile takeovers, and 
therefore lack this motive. Most important, in the private company own-
ership is not separate from control; management is either subject to the 
controlling shareholders or owns a majority of the stock itself. If man-
agement's actions reduce the value of the firm, there are few minority 
shareholders to suffer and most of the loss is borne by management itself. 
Since these managers lack the conflicting motives of managers of public 
companies, the law need not worry here about the private company. 
6. Restriction of the Proposal to Unprofitable Acquisitions.-If 
courts should enjoin acquisitions that depress a corporation's stock price, 
why not enjoin any corporate action that impairs share price? Several 
features distinguish mergers from most other corporate activity. Acqui-
sitions are unusual, major events that often dramatically affect stock 
prices. Most other corporate activities do not influence stock prices to 
such an extent. Even serious mismanagement will only gradually influ-
ence share price over a long period of time. Acquisitions also deserve 
special treatment because they generate losses more often than other ac-
tivities. Although other areas of corporate management, such as product 
development, marketing, and employee relations, may be mishandled, 
they are not unprofitable as frequently as acquisitions. This is not sur-
prising because most other areas do not engender the same conflicts of 
interest as mergers. 143 Heavy reliance on market reactions is somewhat 
risky, 144 and therefore the approach recommended here should apply 
only when there are conflicts of interest and a strong J.U<elihood of dam-
age. Moreover, remedies would be more problematic in other areas. A 
merger is a specific transaction that can be enjoined; general mismanage-
ment is not. Even if damages were a logical remedy for breach of fiduci-
~ry duty, measuring damages for mismanagement would be virtually 
Impossible. 
Nonetheless, there may be other areas of corporate law in which 
. 
142 See supra text accompanying notes 22-25. The desire to grow in order to justify larger execu-
tive perquisites is also largely lacking since private companies do not receive the same scrutiny as 
public companies from the SEC and public shareholders and therefore need not publicly justify their 
executives' compensation. 
143 See supra text accompanying notes 20-30 (motives for mergers). 
144 See supra text accompanying notes 109-28. 
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courts could profitably pay more attention to the market's reaction to 
corporate acts. Most obvious is the area of defenses against tender offers. 
The stock prices of targets generally suffer losses, often staggering, when 
the targets defeat tender offers. 145 This has led many commentators to 
recommend that such defenses be prohibited. 146 Courts might also prof-
itably tackle the continuing use of first-in-first-out (FIFO) rather than 
last-in-first-out (LIFO) inventory accounting. Many corporations stick 
with FIFO in order to report higher earnings, even though FIFO results 
in higher income taxes. 147 The higher reported earnings are only an ac-
counting fiction, however; real indicia of economic performance, such as 
cash flow, are not affected. Shareholders do not benefit from this sleight 
of hand because the stock market is not fooled. 148 It would be entirely 
appropriate for a court to enjoin use of FIFO as corporate waste. 149 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The corporate acquisition plays a crucial part in keeping corporate 
managements diligent, moving assets to their most efficient use, and max-
imizing shareholder wealth. The corporate acquisition can be twisted, 
however, to do precisely the opposite of what is intended-that is, it can 
be used to entrench an inefficient management and keep corporate assets 
under their control. This Article has focused on the latter case, the cor-
porate acquisition that has gone astray and has imposed serious losses on 
investors. This Article proposes to remedy the problem by reinjecting 
the discipline of the market through the legal process. With this ap-
proach the corporate acquisition can regain its proper and salutary role. 
145 See Gilson, supra note 43, at 857-59, 857 n.135. 
146 See supra note 43. 
147 See Lowenstein, supra note 23, at 288-89. 
148 See authorities cited supra note 74. Experts disagree on whether LIFO or FIFO presents a 
more accurate picture of financial condition and performance. T. FIFLIS & H. KRIPKE, AccoUNT-
ING FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS.238-41 (2d ed. 1977). It is conceded, however, that the reason for 
choosing FIFO is rarely its accuracy but rather "a desire to obtain larger payments under wanage-
ment incentive compensation plans, avoid 'take-overs,' make stock options more valuable, pay larger 
dividends and keep shareholder confidence." Id. at 238. Moreover, not only is the market not 
fooled by FIFO, but "the market may tend to put a lower value on companies which seem to be 
unnecessarily disbursing cash by trying to show higher reported income through retention of FIFO." 
I d. at 238-39; see Sunder, Relationships Between Accounting Changes and Stock Prices: Problems of 
Measurement and Same Empirical Evidence, 11 J. AccT. REs. 123 (Supp. 1973) (stock prices of 
firms changing from FIFO to LIFO rose 5%, while prices of firms making the opposite change 
dropped slightly). Thus, absent special circumstances (such as slow inflation or deflation in a partic-
ular industry), the argument for LIFO is compelling. 
149 In a somewhat similar way, Professor Lowenstein has argued that when management pro-
poses to buy out public shareholders there should be an auction for the company with outsiders free 
to bid. Lowenstein, supra note 72, at 731-32, 779-84. Although this approach relies on auction 
rather than stock market prices, the stock market is an ongoing auction, and an auction is a one-time 
market. See id. at 732 ("the marketplace will better protect shareholders than will bankers' opinions 
or judicially administered remedies"). 
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